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Abstract
Machine learning algorithms are known to be sus-
ceptible to data poisoning attacks, where an adver-
sary manipulates the training data to degrade per-
formance of the resulting classifier. In this work,
we propose a strategy for building linear classi-
fiers that are certifiably robust against a strong
variant of label flipping, where each test exam-
ple is targeted independently. In other words, for
each test point, our classifier includes a certifi-
cation that its prediction would be the same had
some number of training labels been changed ad-
versarially. Our approach leverages randomized
smoothing, a technique that has previously been
used to guarantee—with high probability—test-
time robustness to adversarial manipulation of the
input to a classifier. We derive a variant which pro-
vides a deterministic, analytical bound, sidestep-
ping the probabilistic certificates that traditionally
result from the sampling subprocedure. Further,
we obtain these certified bounds with minimal
additional runtime complexity over standard clas-
sification and no assumptions on the train or test
distributions. We generalize our results to the
multi-class case, providing the first multi-class
classification algorithm that is certifiably robust
to label-flipping attacks.
1. Introduction
Modern classifiers, despite their widespread empirical suc-
cess, are known to be susceptible to adversarial attacks.
In this paper, we are specifically concerned with so-called
“data poisoning” attacks (formally, causative attacks [Bar-
reno et al. 2006; Papernot et al. 2018]), where the attacker
manipulates some aspects of the training data in order to
cause the learning algorithm to output a faulty classifier.
Automated machine-learning systems which rely on large,
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user-generated datasets—e.g. email spam filters, product
recommendation engines, and fake review detectors—are
particularly susceptible to such attacks. For example, by
maliciously flagging legitimate emails as spam and misla-
beling spam as innocuous, an adversary can trick a spam
filter into mistakenly letting through a particular email.
Data poisoning attacks in the literature include label-flipping
attacks (Xiao et al., 2012), where the labels of a training set
can be adversarially manipulated to decrease performance
of the trained classifier; general data poisoning, where both
the training inputs and labels can be manipulated (Stein-
hardt et al., 2017); and backdoor attacks (Chen et al., 2017;
Tran et al., 2018), where the training set is corrupted so
as to cause the classifier to deviate from its expected be-
havior only when triggered by a specific pattern. However,
unlike the alternative test-time adversarial setting, where
reasonably effective provable defenses exist, comparatively
little work has been done on building classifiers that are
certifiably robust to targeted data poisoning attacks.
In this work we propose a strategy for building linear classi-
fiers that are certifiably robust to label-flipping attacks. In
particular, we propose a pointwise certified defense—this
means that with each prediction, the classifier includes a
certification guaranteeing that its prediction would not be
different had it been trained on data with some number of
labels flipped. Prior works on certified defenses make sta-
tistical guarantees over the entire test distribution, but they
make no guarantees as to the robustness of a prediction
on any particular test point; thus, a determined adversary
could still cause a specific test point to be misclassified. We
therefore consider the threat of a worst-case adversary that
can make a training set perturbation to target each test point
individually. This motivates a defense that can certify each
of its individual predictions, as we present here. Compared
to traditional robust classification, this framework is supe-
rior for a task such as determining who receives a coveted
resource (a loan, parole, etc.), as it provides a guarantee
for each individual, rather than at the population level. To
the best of our knowledge, this work represents the first
pointwise certified defense to data poisoning attacks.
Our approach leverages randomized smoothing (Cohen
et al., 2019), a technique that has previously been used to
guarantee test-time robustness to adversarial manipulation
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of the input to a deep network. However, where prior uses of
randomized smoothing randomize over the input to the clas-
sifier for test-time guarantees, we instead randomize over
the entire training procedure of the classifier. Specifically,
by randomizing over the labels during this training process,
we obtain an overall classification pipeline that is certified
to not change its prediction when some number of labels
are adversarially manipulated in the training set. Previous
applications of randomized smoothing perform sampling to
provide probabilistic bounds, due to the intractability of in-
tegrating the decision regions of a deep network. We instead
derive an analytical bound, providing truly guaranteed ro-
bustness. Although a naive implementation of this approach
would not be tractable, we show how to obtain these cer-
tified bounds with minimal additional runtime complexity
over standard classification, suffering only a linear cost in
the number of training points.
A further distinction of our approach is that the applicabil-
ity of our robustness guarantees do not rely upon stringent
model assumptions or the quality of the features. Existing
work on robust linear classification or regression provides
certificates that only hold under specific model assumptions,
e.g., recovering the best-fit linear coefficients, which is most
useful when the data exhibit a linear relationship in the fea-
ture space. In contrast, our classifier makes no assumptions
about the separability of the data or quality of the features;
this means our certificates remain valid when applying our
classifier to arbitrary features, which in practice allows us
to leverage advances in unsupervised feature learning (Le,
2013; Chen et al., 2020) and transfer learning (Donahue
et al., 2014). We apply our classifier to pre-trained and
unsupervised deep features to demonstrate its feasibility for
classification of highly non-linear data such as ImageNet.
We evaluate our proposed classifier on several benchmark
datasets common to the data poisoning literature. On the
Dogfish binary classification challenge from ImageNet, our
classifier maintains 81.3% certified accuracy in the face
of an adversary who could reduce an undefended classi-
fier to less than 1%. Additional experiments on MNIST
and CIFAR10 demonstrate our algorithm’s effectiveness for
multi-class classification. Moreover, our classifier maintains
a reasonably competitive non-robust accuracy (e.g., 94.5%
on MNIST 1/7 versus 99.1% for the undefended classifier).
2. Related Work
Data poisoning attacks. A data poisoning attack (Mun˜oz
Gonza´lez et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2017) is an attack where
an adversary corrupts some portion of the training set or
adds new inputs, with the goal of degrading the performance
of the learned model. The adversary is assumed to have
perfect knowledge of the learning algorithm, so security
by design—as opposed to obscurity—is the only viable
defense against such attacks. The adversary is also typically
assumed to have access to the training set and, in some
cases, the test set.
Previous work has investigated attacks and defenses for
data poisoning attacks applied to feature selection (Xiao
et al., 2015), SVMs (Biggio et al., 2011; Xiao et al., 2012),
linear regression (Liu et al., 2017), and PCA (Rubinstein
et al., 2009), to name a few. Some attacks can even achieve
success with “clean-label” attacks, inserting adversarially
perturbed, seemingly correctly labeled training examples
that cause the classifier to perform poorly (Shafahi et al.,
2018; Zhu et al., 2019). Interestingly, our defense can also
be viewed as (the first) certified defense to such attacks: per-
turbing an image such that the resulting features no longer
match the label is theoretically equivalent to changing the
label such that it no longer matches the image’s features.
For an overview of data poisoning attacks and defenses in
machine learning, see Biggio et al. (2014).
Label-flipping attacks. A label-flipping attack is a spe-
cific type of data poisoning attack where the adversary is
restricted to changing the training labels. The classifier is
then trained on the corrupted training set, with no knowl-
edge of which labels have been tampered with. For example,
an adversary could mislabel spam emails as innocuous, or
flag real product reviews as fake.
Unlike random label noise, for which many robust learn-
ing algorithms have been successfully developed (Natarajan
et al., 2013; Liu & Tao, 2016; Patrini et al., 2017), adver-
sarial label-flipping attacks can be specifically targeted to
exploit the structure of the learning algorithm, significantly
degrading performance. Robustness to such attacks is there-
fore harder to achieve, both theoretically and empirically
(Xiao et al., 2012; Biggio et al., 2011). A common defense
technique is sanitization, whereby a defender attempts to
identify and remove or relabel training points that may have
had their labels corrupted (Paudice et al., 2019; Taheri et al.,
2019). Unfortunately, recent work has demonstrated that
this is often not enough against a sufficiently powerful ad-
versary (Koh et al., 2018). Further, no existing defenses
provide pointwise guarantees regarding their robustness.
Certified defenses. Existing works on certified defenses
to adversarial data poisoning attacks typically focus on the
regression case and provide broad statistical guarantees over
the entire test distribution. A common approach to such
certifications is to show that a particular algorithm recovers
some close approximation to the best linear fit coefficients
(Diakonikolas et al., 2019; Prasad et al., 2018; Shen & Sang-
havi, 2019), or that the expected loss on the test distribu-
tion is bounded (Klivans et al., 2018; Chen & Paschalidis,
2018). These results generally rely on assumptions on the
data distribution: some assume sparsity in the coefficients
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(Karmalkar & Price, 2018; Chen et al., 2013) or corruption
vector (Bhatia et al., 2015); others require limited effects of
outliers (Steinhardt et al., 2017). As mentioned above, all
of these methods fail to provide guarantees for individual
test points. Additionally, these statistical guarantees are not
as meaningful when their model assumptions do not hold.
Randomized smoothing. Since the discovery of adver-
sarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al.,
2015), the research community has been investigating tech-
niques for increasing the adversarial robustness of complex
models such as deep networks. After a series of heuristic
defenses, followed by attacks breaking them (Athalye et al.,
2018; Carlini & Wagner, 2017), focus began to shift towards
the development of provable robustness.
One approach which has gained popularity in recent work
is randomized smoothing. Rather than certifying the origi-
nal classifier f , randomized smoothing defines a new clas-
sifier g whose prediction at an input x is the class as-
signed the most probability when x is perturbed with noise
from some distribution µ and passed through f . That is,
g(x) = arg maxc P∼µ(f(x+ ) = c). This new classifier
g is then certified as robust, ideally without sacrificing too
much accuracy compared to f . The original formulation
was presented by Lecuyer et al. (2018) and borrowed ideas
from differential privacy. The above definition is due to Li
et al. (2018) and was popularized by Cohen et al. (2019),
who derived a tight robustness guarantee.
3. A General View of Randomized Smoothing
We begin by presenting a general viewpoint of randomized
smoothing. Under our notation, randomized smoothing
constructs an operator G(µ, φ) that maps a binary-valued1
function φ : X 7→ {0, 1} and a smoothing measure µ :
X 7→ R+, with
∫
X µ(x)dx = 1, to the expected value of φ
under µ (that is,G(µ, φ) represents the “vote” of φweighted
by µ). For example, φ could be a binary image classifier
and µ could be some small, random pixel noise applied to
the to-be-classified image. We also define a “hard threshold”
version g(µ, φ) that returns the most probable output (the
majority vote winner). Formally,
G(µ, φ) = Ex∼µ[φ(x)] =
∫
X
µ(x)φ(x)dx,
g(µ, φ) = 1{G(µ, φ) ≥ 1/2},
where 1{·} is the indicator function. Where it is clear from
context, we will omit the arguments, writing simply G or
1For simplicity, we present the methodology here with binary-
valued functions, which will correspond eventually to binary classi-
fication problems. The extension to the multi-class setting requires
additional notation, and thus is deferred to the appendix.
g. Intuitively, for two similar measures µ, ρ, we would
expect that for most φ, even though G(µ, φ) and G(ρ, φ)
may not be equal, the threshold function g should satisfy
g(µ, φ) = g(ρ, φ). Further, the degree to which µ and ρ can
differ while still preserving this property should increase as
G(µ, φ) approaches either 0 or 1, because this increases the
“margin” with which the function φ is 0 or 1 respectively
over the measure µ. More formally, we define a general
randomized smoothing guarantee as follows:
Definition 1. Let µ : X 7→ R+ be a smoothing measure
over X , with ∫X µ(x)dx = 1.2 Then a randomized smooth-
ing robustness guarantee is a specification of a distance
function over probability measures d(µ, ρ) and a function
f : [0, 1] 7→ R+ such that for all φ : X 7→ {0, 1},
g(µ, φ) = g(ρ, φ) whenever d(µ, ρ) ≤ f(G(µ, φ)). (1)
Informally, (1) says that the majority vote winner of φ
weighted by µ and ρ will be the same, so long as µ and
ρ are “close enough” as a function of the margin with which
the majority wins. We will sometimes use p in place of
G(µ, φ), representing the fraction of the vote that the major-
ity class receives (analogous to pA in Cohen et al. (2019)).
Instantiations of randomized smoothing This defini-
tion is rather abstract, so we highlight concrete examples of
how it can be applied to achieve certified guarantees against
adversarial attacks.
Example 1. The randomized smoothing guarantee of Co-
hen et al. (2019) uses the smoothing measures µ =
N (x0, σ2I), a Gaussian aroound the point x0 to be classi-
fied, and ρ = N (x0 + δ, σ2I), the same measure perturbed
by δ. They prove that (1) holds for all classifiers φ if we
define
d(µ, ρ) =
1
σ
‖δ‖2 ≡
√
2KL(µ ‖ ρ), f(p) = |Φ−1(p)|,
where KL(·) denotes KL divergence and Φ−1 denotes the
inverse CDF of the Gaussian distribution.
Although this work focused on the case of randomized
smoothing of continuous data via Gaussian noise, this is
by no means a requirement. Lee et al. (2019) consider an
alternative approach for dealing with discrete variables.
Example 2. The randomized smoothing guarantee of Lee
et al. (2019) uses the factorized smoothing measure in d
dimensions µα,K(x) = Πdi=1µα,K,i(xi), defined with re-
spect to parameters α ∈ [0, 1],K ∈ N, and a base input
2There is no theoretical reason to restrict µ to be a probability
measure. While this and all previous works only consider prob-
ability measures, the framework we present here could easily be
extended to allow for more general measures µ, ρ and functions φ.
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z ∈ {0, . . . ,K}d, where
µα,K,i(xi) =
{
α, if xi = zi
1−α
K , if xi ∈ {0, . . . ,K}, xi 6= zi,
with xi being the ith dimension of x. ρα,K is similarly
defined for a perturbed input z′. They guarantee that (1)
holds if we define
d(µ, ρ) = ‖z′−z‖0, f(p) = Fα,K,d(max(p, 1−p)). (2)
In words, the smoothing distribution is such that each dimen-
sion is independently perturbed to one of the other K values
uniformly at random with probability 1− α. Fα,K,d(p) is
a combinatorial function defined as the maximum number
of dimensions—out of d total—by which µα,K and ρα,K
can differ such that a set with measure p under µα,K is
guaranteed to have measure at least 12 under ρα,K . Lee et al.
(2019) prove that this value depends only on ‖z′ − z‖0.
Finally, Dvijotham et al. (2020) consider a more general
form of randomized smoothing that doesn’t require strict
assumptions on the distributions but is still able to provide
similar guarantees.
Example 3 (Generic bound). Given any two smoothing dis-
tributions µ, ρ, we have the generic randomized smoothing
robustness certificate, ensuring that (1) holds with defini-
tions
d(µ, ρ) = KL(ρ ‖ µ), f(p) = −1
2
log(4p(1− p)). (3)
Randomized smoothing in practice For deep classifiers,
the expectation G cannot be computed exactly, so we must
resort to Monte Carlo approximation. This is done by draw-
ing samples from µ and using these to construct a high-
probability bound on G for certification. More precisely,
this bound should be a lower bound on G when the hard
prediction g = 1 and an upper bound otherwise; this en-
sures in both cases that we under-certify the true robustness
of the classifier g. The procedure is shown in Algorithm 2
in Appendix A. These estimates can then be plugged into
a randomized smoothing robustness guarantee to provide a
high probability certified robustness bound for the classifier.
4. Label-Flipping Robustness
We now present the main contribution of this paper, a tech-
nique for using randomized smoothing to provide certified
robustness against label-flipping attacks. Specifically, we
first propose a generic strategy for applying randomized
smoothing to certify a prediction function against pointwise
label-flipping attacks. We show how this general approach
can be made tractable using linear least-squares classifi-
cation, and we use the Chernoff inequality to analytically
bound the relevant probabilities for the randomized smooth-
ing certificate. Notably, although we are employing a ran-
domized approach, the final algorithm does not use any
random sampling, but rather relies upon a convex optimiza-
tion problem to compute the certified robustness.
To motivate the approach, we note that in prior work, ran-
domized smoothing was applied at test time with the func-
tion φ : X → {0, 1} being a (potentially deep) classifier
that we wish to smooth. However, there is no require-
ment that the function φ be a classifier at all; the theory
holds for any binary-valued function. Instead of treating
φ as a trained classifier, we consider φ to be an arbitrary
learning algorithm which takes as input a training dataset
{xi, yi}ni=1 ∈ (X ×{0, 1})n and additional test points with-
out corresponding labels, which we aim to predict.3 In other
words, the combined goal of φ is to first train a classifier
and then predict the label of the new example. Thus, we
consider test time outputs to be a function of both the test
time input and the training data that produced the classifier.
This perspective allows us to reason about how changes to
training data affect the classifier at test time, reminiscent
of work on influence functions of deep neural networks
(Koh & Liang, 2017; Yeh et al., 2018). When applying
randomized smoothing in this setting, we randomize over
the labels in the training set, rather than over the test-time
input to be classified. Analogous to previous applications of
randomized smoothing, if the majority vote of the classifiers
trained with these randomly sampled labels has a large mar-
gin, it will confer a degree of robustness to some number of
adversarially corrupted labels.
To formalize this intuition, consider two different assign-
ments of n training labels Y1, Y2 ∈ {0, 1}n which differ
on precisely r labels. Let µ (resp. ρ) be the distribution
resulting from independently flipping each of the labels in
Y1 (resp. Y2) with probability q. It is clear that as r in-
creases, KL(µ ‖ ρ) will also increase. In fact, it is simple
to show (see Appendix B.3 for derivation) that the exact KL
divergence between these two distributions is
KL(µ ‖ ρ) = KL(ρ ‖ µ) = r(1− 2q) log
(
1− q
q
)
. (4)
Plugging in the robustness guarantee (3), we have that
g(µ, φ) = g(ρ, φ) so long as
r ≤ log(4p(1− p))
2(1− 2q) log
(
q
1−q
) , (5)
where p = G(µ, φ). This implies that for any test point,
as long as (5) is satisfied, g’s prediction (the majority vote
3Note that our algorithm does not require access to the test data
to do the necessary precomputation. We present it here as such
merely to give an intuitive idea of the procedure.
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weighted by the smoothing distribution) will not change
if an adversary corrupts the training set from Y1 to Y2, or
indeed to any other training set that differs on at most r
labels. We can tune the noise hyperparameter q to achieve
the largest possible upper bound in (5); more noise will
likely decrease the margin of the majority vote p, but it will
also decrease the divergence.
Computing a tight bound This approach has a simple
closed form, but the bound is not tight. We can derive a
tight bound via a combinatorial approach as in Lee et al.
(2019). By precomputing the quantities F−11−q,1,n(r) from
Equation (2) for each r, we can simply compare p to each of
these and thereby certify robustness to the highest possible
number of label flips. This precomputation can be expensive,
but it provides a significantly tighter robustness guarantee,
certifying approximately twice as many label flips for a
given bound on G (See Figure F.3 in the Appendix).
4.1. Efficient implementation via least squares
classifiers
There may appear to be one major impracticality of the
algorithm proposed in the previous section, if considered
naively: treating the function φ as an entire training-plus-
single-prediction process would require that we train multi-
ple classifiers, over multiple random draws of the labels y,
all to make a prediction on a single example. In this section,
we describe a sequence of tools we employ to restrict the
architecture and training process in a manner that drastically
reduces this cost, bringing it in line with the traditional cost
of standard classification. The full procedure, with all the
parts described below, can be found in Algorithm 1.
Linear least-squares classification The fundamental
simplification we make in this work is to restrict the “train-
ing” of the classifier φ to be done via the solution of a least-
squares problem. Given the training set {xi, yi}ni=1, we as-
sume that there exists some feature mapping h : Rd 7→ Rk
(where k < n). If existing linear features are not avail-
able, this could instead consist of deep features learned
from a similar task—the transferability of such features is
well documented (Donahue et al., 2014; Bo et al., 2010;
Yosinski et al., 2014)—or features could be learned in an
unsupervised fashion on x1:n (learning the features from
poisoned labels could degrade performance). Given this
feature mapping, let X = h(x1:n) ∈ Rn×k be the training
point features and let y = y1:n ∈ {0, 1}n be the labels. Our
training process consists of finding the least-squares fit to
the training data, i.e., we find parameters βˆ ∈ Rk via the
normal equation βˆ =
(
XTX
)−1
XTy and then we make
a prediction on the new example via the linear function
h(xn+1)βˆ. Although it may seem odd to fit a classification
task with least-squares loss, binary classification with lin-
Algorithm 1 Randomized smoothing for label-flipping ro-
bustness
Input: feature mapping h : Rd → Rk; noise parameter
q; regularization parameter λ; training set {(xi, yi) ∈
Rd × {0, 1}}ni=1 (with potentially adversarial labels); ad-
ditional inputs to predict {xj ∈ Rd}mj=1.
1. Pre-compute matrix M,
M = X
(
XTX+ λI
)−1
where X ≡ h(x1:n).
for j = 1, . . . ,m do
1. Compute vector αj = Mh(xj)T .
2. Compute optimal Chernoff parameter t via Newton’s
method
t? = arg min
t
{
t/2+
∑
i:yi=1
log
(
q + (1− q)e−tαji
)
+
∑
i:yi=0
log
(
(1− q) + qe−tαji
)}
and let p? = max(1 − B|t?|, 1/2) where B|t?| is the
Chernoff bound (6) evaluated at |t?|.
Output: Prediction yˆj = 1 {t? ≥ 0} and certification
that prediction will remain constant for up to r training
label flips, where
r =
 log(4p?(1− p?))
2(1− 2q) log
(
q
1−q
)
 .
end for
ear regression is equivalent to Fisher’s linear discriminant
(Mika, 2003) and works quite well in practice.
The real advantage of the least-squares approach is that it
reduces the prediction to a linear function of y, and thus
randomizing over the labels is straightforward. Specifically,
letting
α = X
(
XTX
)−1
h(xn+1)
T ,
the prediction h(xn+1)βˆ can be equivalently given by αTy
(this is effectively the kernel representation of the linear
classifier). Thus, we can simply compute α one time and
then randomly sample many different sets of labels in order
to build a standard randomized smoothing bound. Further,
we can pre-compute just the X
(
XTX
)−1
term and reuse it
for each test point.
`2 regularization for better conditioning It is unlikely
to be the case that the training points are well-behaved for
linear classification in the feature space. To address this, we
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instead solve an `2 regularized version of least-squares. This
is a common tool for solving systems with ill-conditioned
or random design matrices (Hsu et al., 2014; Suggala et al.,
2018). Luckily, there still exists a pre-computable closed-
form solution to this problem, whereby we instead solve
α = X(XTX+ λI)−1h(xn+1)T .
The other parts of our algorithm remain unchanged. Follow-
ing results in Suggala et al. (2018), we set the regularization
parameter λ = (1 + q) σˆ
2k
2n κ(X
TX) for all our experiments,
where σˆ2 = ‖y−XβˆOLS‖
2
2
n−k is an estimate of the variance
(Dicker, 2014) and κ(·) is the condition number.
Efficient tail bounds via the Chernoff inequality Even
more compelling, due to the linear structure of this predic-
tion, we can forego a sampling-based approach entirely and
directly bound the tail probabilities using Chernoff bounds.
Because the underlying binary prediction function φ will
output the label 1 for the test point whenever αTy ≥ 1/2
and 0 otherwise, we can derive an analytical upper bound
on the probability that g predicts one label or the other via
the Chernoff bound. By upper bounding the probability of
the opposite prediction, we simultaneously derive a lower
bound on p which can be plugged in to (5) to determine the
classifier’s robustness. Concretely, we can upper bound the
probability that the classifier outputs the label 0 by
P (αTy ≤ 1/2) ≤ min
t>0
{
et/2
n∏
i=1
E[e−tαiyi ]
}
= min
t>0
{
et/2
n∏
i=1
qe−tαi(1−yi) + (1− q)e−tαiyi
}
. (6)
Conversely, the probability that the classifier outputs the
label 1 is upper bounded by (6) but evaluated at −t. Thus,
we can solve the minimization problem unconstrained over
t, and then let the sign of t dictate which label to predict and
the value of t determine the bound. The objective (6) is log-
convex in t and can be easily solved by Newton’s method.
Note that in some cases, neither Chernoff upper bound will
be less than 1/2, meaning we cannot determine the true
value of g. In these cases, we simply define the classifier’s
prediction to be determined by the sign of t. While we can’t
guarantee that this classification will match the true majority
vote, our algorithm will certify a robustness to 0 flips, so the
guarantee is still valid. We avoid abstaining so as to assess
our classifier’s non-robust accuracy.
The key property we emphasize is that, unlike previous
randomized smoothing applications, the final algorithm in-
volves no randomness whatsoever. Instead, the probabilities
are bounded directly via the Chernoff bound, without any
need for Monte Carlo approximation. Thus, the method is
able to generate truly certifiable robust predictions using ap-
proximately the same complexity as traditional predictions.
5. Experiments
Following Koh & Liang (2017) and Steinhardt et al. (2017),
we perform experiments on MNIST 1/7, the IMDB review
sentiment dataset (Maas et al., 2011), and the Dogfish binary
classification challenge taken from ImageNet. We run ad-
ditional experiments on multi-class MNIST and CIFAR10.
For each dataset and each noise level q we report the cer-
tified test set accuracy at r training label flips. That is, for
each possible number of flips r, we plot the fraction of the
test set that was both correctly classified and certified to not
change under at least r flips.
As mentioned, our classifier suffers an additional linear cost
in the number of training points due to the kernel repre-
sentation αTy. For most datasets there was no discernible
difference in the time required to certify an input via our
technique versus neural network classication. For larger
training sets such as CIFAR10, especially when doing pair-
wise comparisons for the multi-class case, the algorithm is
embarassingly parallel; this parallelism brings runtime back
in line with standard classification.
For binary classification, one could technically achieve a
certified accuracy of 50% at r = ∞ (or 10% for MNIST
or CIFAR10) by letting g be constant—a constant classifier
would be infinitely robust. Though not a very meaningful
baseline, we include the accuracy of such a classifier in our
plots (black dotted line) as a reference. We also evaluated
our classifier with q = 0 (black dash-dot line); this cannot
certify robustness, but it indicates the quality of the features.
To properly justify the need for such certified defenses, and
to get a sense of the scale of our certifications, we generated
label-flipping attacks against the undefended binary MNIST
and Dogfish models. Following previous work, the unde-
fended models were implemented as convolutional neural
networks, trained on the clean data, with all but the top layer
frozen—this is equivalent to multinomial logistic regression
on the learned features. For each test point we recorded how
many flips were required to change the network’s prediction.
This number serves as an upper bound for the robustness
of the network on that test point, but we note that our at-
tacks were quite rudimentary and could almost certainly be
improved upon to tighten this upper bound. Appendix C.1
contains the details of our attack implementations. Finally,
we implemented attacks on our own defense to derive an
empirical upper bound and found that it reasonably tracks
our lower bound. Plots and details of this attack can be
found in Appendix C.2.
In all plots, the solid lines represent certified accuracy (ex-
cept for the undefended classifier, which is an upper bound),
while the dashed lines of the same color are the overall non-
robust accuracy of each classifier. Due to space constraints,
results on IMDB can be found in Appendix D.
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(a) Binary MNIST (classes 1 and 7)
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Figure 1. MNIST 1/7 (n = 13007, top) and full MNIST (n =
60000, bottom) test set certified accuracy to adversarial label flips
as q is varied. The bottom axis represents the number of adversarial
label flips to which each individual prediction is robust, while the
top axis is the same value expressed as a percentage of the training
set size. The solid lines represent certified accuracy; dashed lines of
the same color are the overall non-robust accuracy of each classifier.
The black dotted line is the (infinitely robust) performance of a
constant classifier, while the black dash-dot line is the (uncertified)
performance of our classifier with no label noise.
Results on MNIST The MNIST 1/7 dataset (LeCun et al.,
1998) consists of just the classes 1 and 7, totalling 13,007
training points and 2,163 test points. We trained a simple
convolutional neural network on the other eight MNIST
digits to learn a 50-dimensional feature embedding and then
calculated Chernoff bounds for G as described in Section
4.1. Figure 1a displays the certified accuracy on the test set
for varying probabilities q. As in prior work on randomized
smoothing, the noise parameter q balances a trade-off; as
q increases, the required margin |G− 12 | to certify a given
number of flips decreases. On the other hand, this results
in more noisy training labels, which reduces the margin
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Figure 2. CIFAR10 (n = 50000) test set certified accuracy to
adversarial label flips as q is varied.
and therefore results in lower robustness and often lower
accuracy. Figure 1b depicts the certified accuracy for the
full MNIST test set—see Appendix B for derivations of the
bounds and optimization algorithm in the multi-class case.
In addition to this being a significantly more difficult classi-
fication task, our classifier could not rely on features learned
from other handwritten digits; instead, we extracted the top
30 components with ICA (Hyvarinen, 1999) independently
of the labels. Despite the lack of fine-tuned features, our
algorithm still achieves significant certified accuracy under
a large number of adversarial label flips.
See Figure F.1 in the Appendix for the effect of `2 regular-
ization for the binary case. At a moderate cost to non-robust
accuracy, the regularization results in substantially higher
certified accuracy at almost all radii. We observed that regu-
larization did not make a large difference for the multi-class
case, possibly due to the inaccuracy of the residual term in
the noise estimate.
Results on CIFAR10 To further demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of our classifier with unsupervised features, we
used SimCLR (Chen et al., 2020) to learn unsupervised fea-
tures for CIFAR10. We used PCA to reduce the features to
128 dimensions to reduce overfitting. Figure 2 shows the
results: our classifier with q = 0.12 achieves 50% certified
accuracy up to 175 labels flips (recall there are ten classes,
not two) and decays gracefully. Further, the classifier main-
tains better than random chance certified accuracy up to 427
label flips, which is approximately 1% of the training set.
Because the “votes” are changed by flipping so few labels,
high values of q reduce the models’ predictions to almost
pure chance—this means we are unable to achieve the mar-
gins necessary to certify a large number of flips. We there-
fore found that smaller levels of noise achieved higher certi-
fied test accuracy. This suggests that the more susceptible
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Figure 3. Dogfish (n = 1800) test set certified accuracy to adver-
sarial label flips as q is varied.
the original, non-robust classifier is to label flips, the lower
q should be set for the corresponding randomized classifier.
For much smaller values of q, slight differences did not
decrease the non-robust accuracy—they did however have a
large effect on certified robustness. This indicates that the
sign of t? is relatively stable, but the margin of G is much
less so. This same pattern was observed with the IMDB
and Dogfish datasets. We used a high-precision arithmetic
library (Johansson et al., 2013) to achieve the necessary
lower bounds, but the precision required for non-vacuous
bounds grew extremely fast for q < 10−4; optimizing (6)
quickly became too computationally expensive.
Results on Dogfish The Dogfish dataset contains images
from the ImageNet dog and fish synsets, 900 training points
and 300 test points from each. We trained a ResNet-50
(He et al., 2016) on the standard ImageNet training set but
removed all images labeled dog or fish. Our pre-trained
network therefore learned meaningful image features but
had no features specific to either class. We again used PCA
to reduce the feature space dimensionality. Figure 3 displays
the results of our poisoning attack along with our certified
defense. Under the undefended model, more than 99% of
the test points can be successfully attacked with no more
than 23 label flips, whereas our model with q = 10−4 can
certifiably correctly classify 81.3% of the test points under
the same threat model. It would take more than four times
as many flips—more than 5% of the training set—for each
test point individually to reduce our model to less than 50%
certified accuracy.
Here we observe the same pattern, where reducing q
does not have a large effect on non-robust accuracy but
does increase robustness significantly. This provides
further evidence for the hypothesis that more complex
datasets/classifiers are more susceptible to attacks and
should be smoothed with less label noise.
Figure F.2 in the Appendix shows our classifier’s perfor-
mance with unsupervised features. Because Dogfish is such
a small dataset (n = 1800), deep unsupervised feature
learning techniques were not feasible—we instead learned
overcomplete features on 16x16 image patches using RICA
(Le, 2013).
6. Conclusion
In this work we presented a certified defense against a strong
class of label-flipping attacks where an adversary can flip
labels for each test point individually. This contrasts with
previous data poisoning settings which have typically only
considered an adversary who wishes to degrade the classi-
fier’s accuracy on the test distribution as a whole. Leverag-
ing randomized smoothing, a method originally used for cer-
tifying robustness to test-time perturbations, we presented
a classifier that can be certified robust to these pointwise
train-time attacks. We then offered a tractable algorithm
for evaluating this classifier which, despite being rooted
in randomization, can be computed with no Monte Carlo
sampling whatsoever, resulting in a truly certifiably robust
classifier. This results in the first multi-class classification
algorithm that is certifiably robust to label-flipping attacks.
A particular strength of this framework is when we specifi-
cally care about robustly classifying each input individually.
Compared to traditional robust classification, this technique
is superior for determining who receives a coveted resource
(a loan, parole, etc.) or for making some other sensitive
classification, as it provides a guarantee for each individ-
ual. Other works only ensure that they correctly classify
X% of the population, which is often not acceptable as that
still leaves (100-X)% who could be misclassified, with no
indication of which ones belong to the test set.
There are several avenues for improvements to this line of
work, perhaps the most immediate being the method for
learning the input features. The analysis could also be ex-
tended to other types of smoothing distributions applied to
the training data, such as randomizing over the input fea-
tures, to provide robustness to more general data poisoning
attacks. Finally, we hope that our defense to this threat
model will inspire the development of more powerful (e.g.,
pointwise) train-time attacks, against which future defenses
can be evaluated.
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A. Generic Randomized Smoothing Algorithm
Algorithm 2 Generic randomized smoothing procedure
Input: function φ : X → {0, 1}, number of samples N , smoothing distribution µ, test point to predict x0, failure
probability δ > 0.
for i = 1, . . . , N do
Sample xi ∼ µ(x0) and compute yi = φ(xi).
end for
Compute approximate smoothed output
gˆ(µ, φ) = 1
{(
1
N
N∑
i=1
yi
)
≥ 1
2
}
.
Compute bound Gˆ(µ, φ) such that with probability ≥ 1− δ
Gˆ(µ, φ)
{ ≤ G(µ, φ) if gˆ(µ, φ) = 1
≥ G(µ, φ) if gˆ(µ, φ) = 0.
Output: Prediction gˆ(µ, φ) and probability bound Gˆ(µ, φ), or abstention if gˆ(µ, φ) 6= sign(Gˆ(µ, φ)− 12 ).
B. The Multi-Class Setting
Although the notation and algorithms are slightly more complex, all the methods we have discussed in the main paper can
be extended to the multi-class setting. In this case, we consider a class label y ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, and we again seek some
smoothed prediction such that the classifier’s prediction on a new point will not change with some number r flips of the
labels in the training set.
B.1. Randomized smoothing in the multi-class case
We here extend our notation to the case of more than two classes. Recall our original definition of G,
G(µ, φ) = Ex∼µ[φ(x)] =
∫
X
µ(x)φ(x)dx,
where φ : X 7→ {0, 1}. More generally, consider a classifier φ : X 7→ [K], outputting the index of one of K classes. Under
this formulation, for a given class c ∈ [K], we have
G(µ, φ, c) = Ex∼µ[φc(x)] =
∫
X
µ(x)φc(x)dx,
where φc(x) = 1 {φ(x) = c} is the indicator function for if φ(x) outputs the class c. In this case, the hard threshold g is
evaluated by returning the class with the highest probability. That is,
g(µ, φ) = arg max
c
G(µ, φ, c).
B.2. Linearization and Chernoff bound approach for the multi-class case
Using the same linearization approach as in the binary case, we can formulate an analogous approach which forgoes the need
to actually perform random sampling at all and instead directly bounds the randomized classifier using the Chernoff bound.
Adopting the same notation as in the main text, the equivalent least-squares classifier for the multi-class setting finds some
set of weights
βˆ =
(
XTX
)−1
XTY
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where Y ∈ {0, 1}n×K is a binary matrix with each row equal to a one-hot encoding of the class label (note that the resulting
βˆ ∈ Rk×K is now a matrix, and we let βˆi refer to the ith column). At prediction time, the predicted class of some new
point xn+1 is simply given by the prediction with the highest value, i.e.,
yˆn+1 = arg max
i
βˆi
T
h(xn+1).
Alternatively, following the same logic as in the binary case, this same prediction can be written in terms of the α variable as
yˆn+1 = arg max
i
αTYi
where Yi denotes the ith column of Yi.
In our randomized smoothing setting, we again propose to flip the class of any label with probability q, selecting an
alternative label uniformly at random from the remaining K − 1 labels. Assuming that the predicted class label is i, we wish
to bound the probability that
P (αTYi < α
TYi′)
for all alternative classes i′. By the Chernoff bound, we have that
logP (αTYi < α
TYi′) = logP (α
T (Yi −Yi′) ≤ 0)
≤ min
t>0

n∑
j=1
logE
[
e−tαj(Yji−Yji′ )
] .
The random variable Yji −Yji′ takes on three different distributions depending on if yj = i, if yj = i′, or if yj 6= i and
yj 6= i′. Specifically, this variable can take on the terms +1, 0,−1 with the associated probabilities
P (Yji −Yji′ = +1) =
{
1− q if yj = i,
q/(K − 1) otherwise.
P (Yji −Yji′ = −1) =
{
1− q if yj = i′,
q/(K − 1) otherwise.
P (Yji −Yji′ = 0) =
{
q(K − 2)/(K − 1) if yj = i or yj = i′,
1− 2q/(K − 1) otherwise.
Combining these cases directly into the Chernoff bound gives
logP (αTYi < α
TYi′) ≤ min
t>0
{ ∑
j:yj=i
log
(
(1− q)e−tαj + qK − 2
K − 1 +
q
K − 1e
tαj
)
+
∑
j:yj=i′
log
(
q
K − 1e
−tαj + q
K − 2
K − 1 + (1− q)e
tαj
)
+
∑
j:yj 6=i,yj 6=i′
log
(
q
K − 1e
−tαj + 1− 2 q
K − 1 +
q
K − 1e
tαj
)}
.
Again, this problem is convex in t, and so can be solved efficiently using Newton’s method. And again since the reverse case
can be computed via the same expression we can similarly optimize this in an unconstrained fashion. Specifically, we can do
this for every pair of classes i and i′, and return the i which gives the smallest lower bound for the worst-case choice of i′.
B.3. KL Divergence Bound
To compute actual certification radii, we will derive the KL divergence bound for the the case of K classes. Let µ, ρ be
defined as in Section 4, except that as in the previous section when a label is flipped with probability q it is changed to one
of the other K − 1 classes uniformly at random. Let µi and ρi refer to the independent measures on each dimension which
collectively make up the factorized distributions µ and ρ (i.e., µ(x) =
∏d
i=1 µi(x)). Further, let Y
i
1 be the i
th element of Y1,
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meaning it is the “original” label which may or may not be flipped when sampling from µ. First noting that each dimension
of the distributions µ and ρ are independent, we have
KL(ρ ‖ µ) =
n∑
i=1
KL(ρi ‖ µi)
=
∑
i:ρi 6=µi
KL(ρi ‖ µi)
= r
 K∑
j=1
ρi(j) log
(
ρi(j)
µi(j)
)
= r
(
ρi(Y
i
1 ) log
(
ρi(Y
i
1 )
µi(Y i1 )
)
+ ρi(Y
i
2 ) log
(
ρi(Y
i
2 )
µi(Y i2 )
))
= r
(
(1− q) log
(
1− q
q
K−1
)
+
q
K − 1 log
( q
K−1
1− q
))
= r
(
1− Kq
K − 1
)
log
(
(1− q)(K − 1)
q
)
.
Plugging in the robustness guarantee (3), we have that g(µ, φ) = g(ρ, φ) so long as
r ≤ log(4p(1− p))
2(1− KqK−1 ) log
(
q
(1−q)(K−1)
) .
Setting K = 2 recovers the divergence term (4) and the bound (5).
C. Description of Label-Flipping Attacks
C.1. Attacks on Undefended Classifiers
Due to the dearth of existing work on label-flipping attacks for deep networks, our attacks on MNIST and Dogfish were
quite straightforward; we expect significant improvements could be made to tighten this upper bound.
For Dogfish, we used a pre-trained Inception network (Szegedy et al., 2016) to evaluate the influence of each training point
with respect to the loss of each test point (Koh & Liang, 2017). As in prior work, we froze all but the top layer of the
network for retraining. Once we obtained the most influential points, we flipped the first one and recomputed approximate
influence using only the top layer for efficiency. After each flip, we recorded which points were classified differently and
maintained for each test point the successful attack which required the fewest flips. When this was finished, we also tried the
reverse of each attack to see if any of them could be achieved with even fewer flips.
For MNIST we implemented two similar attacks and kept the best attack for each test point. The first attack simply ordered
training labels by their `2 distance from the test point in feature space, as a proxy for influence. We then tried flipping these
one at a time until the prediction changed, and we also tried the reverse. The second attack was essentially the same as
the Dogfish attack, ordering the test points by influence. To calculate influence we again assumed a frozen feature map;
specifically, using the same notation as Koh & Liang (2017), the influence of flipping the label of a training point z = (x, y)
to z− = (x, 1− y) on the loss at the test point ztest is:
dL(ztest, θˆ,z−,−z)
d
= ∇θL(ztest, θˆ)T dθˆ,z
−,−z
d
≈ −∇θL(ztest, θˆ)TH−1θˆ
(
∇θL(z−, θˆ)−∇θL(z, θˆ)
)
.
For logistic regression these values can easily be computed in closed form.
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(a) Binary MNIST (classes 1 and 7)
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Figure C.1. MNIST 1/7 and Dogfish certified lower bounds (solid) compared to empirical upper bounds (dashed) of our classifier and the
undefended classifier. Our classifier’s upper and lower bounds are reasonably close, and they get closer as q decreases. The gap is due to
the potential looseness of the Chernoff bound, though in practice we would expect the true robustness to be closer to the upper bound.
C.2. Attacks on Our Classifier
Recall that our theoretical classifier outputs a prediction based on P (αTy ≥ 1/2), where the randomness is over the label
flips of y. More specifically, the classifier’s output is based on a weighted majority vote of “sub-classifiers”, each of which
is a simple linear classifier which outputs 1{αT yˆ ≥ 1/2} for its own labels yˆ. The sub-classifier’s vote is weighted by its
probability under the smoothing distribution, which depends only on ‖y − yˆ‖0 (and is monotonically decreasing in this
value). It is clear that the optimal attack to reduce P (αTy ≥ 1/2) is to flip the labels which will push the inner product
αTy as much as possible towards the incorrect label: flipping labels by their change to the inner product will add weight to
the votes of the most overall number of incorrect sub-classifiers, pushing our smoothed classifier to be incorrect.
Here we make a subtle distinction: while this attack is optimal for the purpose of reducing P (αTy ≥ 1/2), it is not
necessarily optimal against our classifier, even though this probability represents how our classifier (theoretically) makes a
prediction. This is because in practice, we never actually compute P (αTy ≥ 1/2). Instead, recall from (6) that we use the
Chernoff inequality to tightly bound this probability. Thus, while the attack described above is optimal for reducing the true
probability (and therefore the theoretical robustness), it is technically possible that a different attack would cause a looser
Chernoff bound, more effectively reducing our bound on the probability. In essence, our attack is optimal for modifying the
LHS of (6), but not necessarily the RHS, which is ultimately how our classifier actually makes predictions.
With that said, the existence of an attack which causes the Chernoff bound to return a particularly sub-optimal bound
seems debatable. So, while we present these results as an empirical upper bound, we believe it would not be inappropriate
to also view them as an approximate lower bound. Of course, the actual lower bound returned by our classifier is still a
genuinely guaranteed certificate. Figure C.1a displays the result of our attack on MNIST 1/7, with the undefended classifier
for comparison. Observe that the empirical upper bounds (dashed lines) track the guaranteed lower bounds (solid lines)
reasonably closely. The gap is under 10% accuracy and shrinks as the noise q decreases. Further, this empirical robust
accuracy outperforms the undefended classifier’s empirical robust accuracy by an even larger margin. Figure C.1b presents
the same results on the Dogfish dataset. Our empirical attacks had very similar success rates for all values of q, so we only
plot two values along with the undefended classifier. We again observe a tight correspondence between upper and lower
bounds which gets tighter with smaller q.
D. Experimental Results on the IMDB Sentiment Analysis Database
Figure D.1 plots the result of our randomized smoothing procedure on the IMDB review sentiment dataset. This dataset
contains 25,000 training examples and 25,000 test examples, evenly split between “positive” and “negative”. To extract
the features we applied the Google News pre-trained Word2Vec to all the words in each review and averaged them. This
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Figure D.1. IMDB Review Sentiment (n = 25000) test set certified accuracy. The non-robust accuracy slightly decreases as q increases;
for q = 0.01 the non-robust accuracy is 79.11%, while for q = 0.1 it is 78.96%.
feature embedding is considerably noisier than that of an image dataset, as most of the words in a review are irrelevant to
sentiment classification. Indeed, Steinhardt et al. (2017) also found that the IMDB dataset was much more susceptible to
adversarial corruption than images when using bag-of-words features. Consistent with this, we found smaller levels of
noise resulted in larger certified accuracy. We expect significant improvements could be made with a more refined choice of
feature embedding.
E. Additional Results
To supplement the line plots, for each dataset and noise parameter we present here precise certified test set accuracy at
specific numbers of label flips. When available, for comparison we also provide the undefended classifier’s empirical
accuracy when subjected to our label-flipping attack as detailed in Section C.1. For each number of label flips, the noise
hyperparameter setting which results in the highest certified accuracy is in bold.
MNIST 1/7 (n = 13007, 2 classes)
Noise q CA at 1 Label Flip (CA@1) CA@10 CA@100 CA@500 CA@1000 CA@1500 CA@2000
(undefended) (.9903) (.9815) (.9163) (.4674) (.1503) (.0388) (.0065)
0.3 .9399 .9320 .8918 .7470 .5726 .4681 .4089
0.4 .8659 .8571 .8248 .7152 .6283 .5566 .5072
0.45 .7855 .7767 .7540 .7004 .6556 .6218 .5950
0.475 .7294 .7262 .7118 .6873 .6674 .6503 .6378
Table 1. Certified test set accuracy (CA) on MNIST 1/7 (Figure 1a), with the undefended classifier’s empirical robust accuracy for
comparison. Random guessing or a constant classifier would attain 50% accuracy.
Full MNIST (n = 60000, 10 classes)
Noise q CA at 1 Label Flip (CA@1) CA@10 CA@100 CA@200 CA@300 CA@400 CA@500
0.0125 .5693 .5689 .5212 .4292 .3333 .2446 .1706
0.025 .5713 .5701 .5053 .4040 .2999 .2096 .1407
0.05 .5495 .5486 .4954 .4160 .3400 .2633 .2012
Table 2. Certified test set accuracy (CA) on Full MNIST (Figure 1b). Random guessing or a constant classifier would attain 10% accuracy.
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Dogfish (n = 1800, 2 classes)
Noise q CA at 1 Label Flip (CA@1) CA@10 CA@25 CA@50 CA@75 CA@100 CA@150
(undefended) (.9367) (.2933) (.0050) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000) (.0000)
0.0001 .8950 .8667 .8083 .7150 .6233 .5167 .3267
0.001 .8950 .8550 .7967 .6967 .5917 .4750 .3017
0.01 .8800 .8333 .7583 .6617 .5283 .4250 .2367
0.05 .9367 .7833 .7033 .5567 .4350 .3200 .1583
Table 3. Certified test set accuracy (CA) on Dogfish (Figure 3), with the undefended classifier’s empirical robust accuracy for comparison.
Random guessing or a constant classifier would attain 50% accuracy.
IMDB Sentiment Analysis (n = 25000, 2 classes)
Noise q CA at 1 Label Flip (CA@1) CA@10 CA@25 CA@50 CA@100 CA@200 CA@300
0.01 .6275 .5980 .5882 .5686 .5392 .4804 .4412
0.025 .6364 .6154 .5944 .5594 .5105 .4406 .3287
0.05 .5878 .5344 .5038 .4656 .4160 .3206 .2519
0.1 .7585 .7034 .6469 .5806 .4788 .3263 .2135
Table 4. Certified test set accuracy (CA) on the IMDB Sentiment Analysis dataset (Figure D.1). Random guessing or a constant classifier
would attain 50% accuracy.
CIFAR10 (n = 50000, 10 classes)
Noise q CA at 1 Label Flip (CA@1) CA@10 CA@50 CA@100 CA@200 CA@300 CA@400
0.012 .7180 .7158 .6800 .6234 .4493 .2520 .1201
0.025 .7068 .7017 .6597 .5949 .4051 .1870 .0548
0.1 .7040 .6876 .6230 .5384 .3019 .0981 .0213
Table 5. Certified test set accuracy (CA) on CIFAR10 (Figure 2). Random guessing or a constant classifier would attain 10% accuracy.
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Figure F.1. MNIST 1/7 test set certified accuracy with and without `2 regularization in the computation of α. Note that the unregularized
solution achieves almost 100% non-robust accuracy, but certifies significantly lower robustness. This implies that the “training” process is
not robust enough to label noise, hence the lower margin by the ensemble. In comparison, the regularized solution achieves significantly
higher margins, at a slight cost in overall accuracy.
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Figure F.2. Dogfish test set certified accuracy using features learned with RICA (Le, 2013). While not as performant as the pre-trained
features, our classifier still achieves reasonable certified accuracy—note that the certified lines are lower bounds, while the undefended
line is an upper bound. As demonstrated in the main body, deep unsupervised features significantly boost performance, but require a
larger dataset.
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Figure F.3. Left: Required margin p to certify a given number of label flips using the generic KL bound (5) versus the tight discrete bound
(2). Right: The same comparison, but inverted, showing the certifiable robustness for a given margin. The tight bound certifies robustness
to approximately twice as many label flips.
